This study employs recursive path analysis techniques to develop a causal model of legislative success in the "one party-no party" state legislature of Arkansas. Utilizing a unique fivestep process to measure bill-passage through the Arkansas House, four direct paths to legislative success were identified: educational level, age, race, and seniority. The final model suggests a legislative body in transition from amateur status and exclusivity to one more autonomous and competitive.
Introduction
The main task of state legislatures involves passing bills into law. Approximately 250,000 bills are introduced every biennium, and nearly one-fifth are enacted into law (Book o f the States 1990). Recognizing the paramount importance of the legislative function, political scientists have long sought to identify those factors which facilitate the passage of legislation. Identification of the determinants of legislative success is necessary if political scientists are to understand and predict legislative behavior and output; it is necessary for citizens who want to elect effective representatives who can best serve their interests; and it is necessary for legislators themselves who wish to serve their constituents in an effective manner.
Regrettably, studies that use state legislators as units of analysis in an attempt to integrate the diverse and disparate findings of this field into a theory of legislative success have largely failed. Aside from Meyer's (1980) causal analysis of the 1973 North Carolina state legisla ture, there have been no further attempts at model building in this area of study. Furthermore, legislative studies that do exist have tended to 1) emphasize bivariate statistical designs (as opposed to multivariate); 2) examine "reputation" for influence rather than "actual" legislative success; and 3) focus on two-party or modified one-party dominant state legislatures.
This article seeks to address these gaps in the literature by utilizing recursive path analysis techniques to develop a causal model of legislative success in the "one party-no party" state legislature of Ar kansas.1 In addition, legislative success will be measured directly using a relatively new method we believe to be an improvement over previous efforts.
Literature Review and Model Development
A review of the literature on the determinants of legislative success revealed three comprehensive categories: personal, institu tional, and environmental.2 With respect to personal attributes, a number of studies indicated that education, occupation, age, gender, race, and political ideology were likely contributors to a legislator's success (or lack of it) in bill passage. For example, better educated legislators should be able to communicate more clearly within the legis lative arena, and to grasp complex issues and formulate solutions to problems more readily than their less educated colleagues (Meyer 1980; Rosenthal 1981,57-60; Weissert 1988; Rosenthal 1989,75-76) . Legisla tors with prestigious occupations may enjoy a higher esteem among col leagues (Meyer 1980) . Attorneys, in particular, may be advantaged because of their training in an area (bill drafting) essential to the legislative process (Weissert 1988) .3
Legislative performance and its relationship to age is unclear. Some argue that the relationship is curvilinear in nature (Weissert 1988) . Here a legislator's success is thought to increase with age and then decline as energy levels decrease and issue stands become anachro nistic. Others argue that the relationship is negative. They cite the professionalization of state legislatures in recent decades as creating a window of opportunity for junior members to make a "name" for themselves early in their careers (Rosenthal 1981, 31, 57-59; Ellickson and Whistler 1989,16) .
Evidence regarding the impact of race and gender on legislative success is limited and conflicting. While several studies have discerned no significant differences in legislative success based on race or gender (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Thompson and Moncrief 1990) , others have noted the dearth of women and blacks in many state houses (Rosenthal 1981, 30-31) . Because representatives of these groups are likely to have less seniority and expertise and to hold fewer leadership positions than white male representatives, we would expect them also to be less successful in the legislature.
Finally, the pervasiveness of conservatism among southern state legislators suggests that success should accrue to those holding conser vative views (Wolfinger and Hollinger 1970; Meyer 1980). The literature also indicated that institutional variables may be important determinants of legislative behavior. Serving the legislature in a formal capacity (i.e., party leadership position and/or committee leadership role) is evidence of legislative involvement and value to the legislature (Best 1971; Frantzich 1979) . Party leaders have access to nu merous sources of informal power (Rosenthal 1981) , and thus greater potential for success in the legislature (Meyer 1980) . Similarly, prestig ious committee assignments can allow legislators to become leading experts on select subjects, thereby enhancing their special status among colleagues (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson 1962; Smith and Deering 1984; Sinclair 1986) .
Seniority is another institutional characteristic often associated with legislative success. In a tradition-laden institution such as the legislature, seniority provides a rough but apt indicator of political experience, achievement, and accumulated wisdom-all plausible con tributors to success (Frantzich 1979; Meyer 1980; Squire 1988) .
A final subset of attributes concerns the environmental con straints within which legislators must operate. Geographic and urbanrural differences may generate political issues which enhance or detract from a legislator's standing in the legislature. For example, there is a longstanding historical schism between the northwest hill region of Arkansas and the delta lowlands (Ledbetter 1972, 16-18; Hinshaw 1986) . The pre-Civil War delta plantation culture supported the war, while the non-slaveholding mountain and hill counties in northwest Arkansas opposed it and ultimately developed into a hotbed of populism after the war (Key 1949,5-8; Bass and DeVries 1976,88; Hinshaw 1986 ). This heterogeneous mix of mountain and delta populations has resulted in separate and distinct constituencies within the Arkansas General Assembly (Griffin 1971, 17) , although Savage and Blair (1984, 59-85) believe that this geographic division may have lessened somewhat in recent years.
A second environmental factor, urban-rural district representa tion, has historically been a major source of legislative conflict (Jewell 1964; Francis 1967) . Despite the reapportionment movement of the 1960s, rural power has been slow to dissipate in some southern states (see Tickamyer 1983) . Indeed, Arkansas itself has a long history of intense urban-rural conflict in the legislature (Francis 1967,41) and has frequently pursued the strategy of placing rural conservative Democrats in key leadership positions to perpetuate rural influence (Saffell 1987, 122) . Hence, we would anticipate rural legislators in Arkansas to be more effective than those from urban districts.
These factors by no means exhaust the list of attributes which may affect a legislator's ability to secure passage of his or her legislation. Policy expertise, political friendship and trust, strength of local interest groups, level of district competition, and the internal organization of a legislature have all been cited as possible factors in any model of legislative effectiveness (see Rosen 1974; Meyer 1980; Caldeira and Patterson 1988; Squire 1988) . Unfortunately, the arduousness of data collection and the desirability of model parsimony require the selective incorporation of a limited number of variables in any research project.
With respect to our dependent variable, legislative success, most earlier studies used reputational measures based on "perceptions of in fluence" (see Francis 1962; Best 1971; Meyer 1980) . Dahl (1976) and others have criticized the reputational approach on the grounds that potential for influence does not necessarily result in actual success. Consequently, more recent studies have sought to measure legislative success directly (see Frantzich 1979; Hamm et al. 1983; Ellickson and Whistler 1989) . Here the operational focus is on a lawmaker's ability to convert his or her legislation into law. The assertion is made that success is not identifiable until a legislator's preferences on important decisions prevail on a regular basis (Dahl 1961) . In this study we will utilize the direct measurement approach and will incorporate "reputation for influence" as an intervening variable in our model of legislative success.
Guided by the literature on legislatures, a descriptive model il lustrating presumed causal relationships among major variables was constructed. As shown in Figure 1 below, personal and environmental factors are treated as determinants of seniority, formal office, reputa tion, and legislative success. Additionally, institutional status variables and reputation for influence are viewed as causal forces on legislative success.
Research Design: Setting and Measurements
The units of analysis in this study were all Democratic legislators in the 1981 session of the Arkansas House of Representatives.4 Specific measures regarding personal, institutional, and environmental attrib utes are contained in Appendix A. Data regarding reputation for influence were obtained through interviews with 84 of 100 House members.5 The survey questionnaire included the following question: 
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House members were ranked from highest to lowest based upon the number of mentions given to individual representatives. To measure our dependent variable, legislative success, we ob served how successful a legislator was at getting his or her bills passed through the House chamber.6 In a previous study, twenty-six legislative maneuvers leading to bill passage in the Arkansas legislature were identified (see Whistler and Ellickson 1988) . This coding scheme was modified by combining similar legislative maneuvers to identify the five major legislative steps necessary for bill passage in the Arkansas House chamber (see Appendix B). Bill-passage success for each legislator was then calculated by "scoring" each bill submitted according to the index in Appendix B and totalling the results.7 For example, legislator A submits six bills: two bills never make it out of committee (1 point each), one bill is debated on the House floor, but receives no further action (2 points), one bill is defeated on the House floor (3 points), and two bills pass the House chamber with minimal formal legislative maneuvering (5 points each). Legislator A, then, is accorded 17 points using this procedure.8
This system of measurement rewards those legislators who sub mit a large quantity of bills (active) and who are successful at maneuver ing them through the five-step process described above (productive).
Other legislators can score moderately well if they are active or produc tive. Those who are neither active nor productive should receive low scores under this system of evaluation. The distribution of bills on this five-point index, displayed in Table 1 , indicated that approximately 30 percent of the bills introduced were disposed of very early in the legislative process. Nearly 60 percent of bills introduced into the House chamber were passed successfully, with 36 percent doing so with little or no formal legislative maneuvering. This rather high bill-passage success rate reflects the "politics of accom modation" characteristic of one party-no party state legislatures (Rosen thal 1981,258-259) .
Unlike previous efforts to measure legislative success directly by examining bill activity (Olson and Nonidez 1972; Hamm et al. 1983) or bill productivity (Francis 1962; Frantzich 1979) , this approach empha sizes the importance of both bill activity and bill productivity in a single measure. We believe this two-dimensional approach to be an improve ment over current one-dimensional designs. 
Meeting Assumptions and Model Estimation
Intercorrelations among the exogenous variables were exam ined to determine if multicollinearity was a problem. Even though there is no agreement as to what constitutes substantial correlation among independent variables (Pedhazur 1982,232-233) , the common practice of using bivariate correlations of .75 or higher as a benchmark (Asher 1983, 52) suggested multicollinearity was not a problem. A more stringent test for collinearity advocated by Lewis-Beck (1980, 59-61) involved regressing each independent variable on all remaining inde pendent variables. In doing so, we found the largest coefficient of multiple determination (R2) to be .48. Thus, we were satisfied that multicollinearity was not a problem in this study.
An inspection of scattergrams indicated that the relationships be tween each variable and legislative success were approximately linear. Several variables were recoded so that they were normally distributed, while gender (male, female), race (black, white), and political ideology' (liberal, conservative) were coded as dummy variables. Finally, it was assumed that the residual "error" terms were uncorrelated and that the causal paths involved no reciprocal causation. We recognize the perils of the uncorrelated error term assumption.9 We also recognize the trade-off of reaching erroneous conclusions versus the value of achiev ing a reasonably clear and simple model.
Analysis of the Arkansas House model proceeded in two steps. First, based on the review of the literature and analysis of the zero-order correlation matrix (for all variables), an initial model in the form of an arrow diagram was constructed. Variables with insignificant correla tions (p > .0 5 ) to any of the endogenous variables were eliminated. Then by applying the Simon-Blalock technique of observing where linkages between pairs of variables had been omitted and generating predictions concerning certain partial correlation coefficients, the model was even tually fully trimmed (Blalock 1964, 61-94) . The "final" model is repre sented by the arrow diagrams and structural equations in Figure 2 . Second, once the model was trimmed, recursive path analysis was used to estimate the magnitude of the linkages between variables.10 To obtain estimates of the main path coefficients, each endogenous vari able was regressed on those variables that directly impinged upon it. These path coefficients were then used to examine the underlying causal processes within the Arkansas House and to estimate the relative impor tance of alternative paths of influence/effectiveness.11 The model (with direct and indirect effects) is depicted in Figure 3 .
Findings
Figure 1 had predicted that legislative success of Arkansas House Democrats would be enhanced by the characteristics of being a well educated white male with a prestigious occupation; by being a representative from a rural agricultural district in the delta; by being conservative; and by having seniority, a formal position within the legislature, and professional respect from one's colleagues. The antici pated relationship of age to legislative success was unclear based on con flicting evidence in the literature.
Our findings, portrayed in Figure 3 , lend only partial support to this profile of a successful legislator. As expected, educational level and race were important determinants of legislative success with direct effects of B = .24 and B = .21, respectively. The impact of race was muted somewhat by the inverse relationship between race and educa tional level, i.e., black legislators tended to be better educated than white legislators. Expectations with regard to the remaining personal attrib utes of occupational prestige, gender, and political ideology were not borne out in the analysis.
By far the most powerful direct path to legislative success in the Arkansas House was through seniority, with its direct effect (B = .40) nearly twice that of any other variable. In a one party-no party legisla ture, without political parties to channel conflict, we are not surprised to find legislative success so heavily dependent upon personal accumu lation of years of service. Likewise, we are not surprised at the powerful impact of seniority on formal position in the legislature (B = .64) and reputation for effectiveness. While seniority had a slightly weaker direct effect on "reputation" than did formal office (B = .31 vs. B = .35, re spectively), it had a substantially greater total effect (B = .53 vs. B = .35, respectively). These findings are similar to those reported in the Meyer (1980) study.
Interestingly, age was a variable whose impact was felt both directly (B = -.24) and indirectly (B = .22) via seniority. As expected, older legislators were associated with greater years of service in the legislature which, in turn, operated directly on legislative success. Younger representatives, however, benefited from a direct path to legislative LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS success, yielding a net effect of approximately zero (-.02) for this vari able. These opposing paths to legislative success may reflect the growing modernization of the Arkansas House, a trend characteristic of most state legislatures in the 1980s (Dresang and Gosling 1989; Opheim 1990) .12 As the exclusiveness of the "good ol' boy" network is dimin ished, we would anticipate a gradual shift in power from older, amateur legislators to younger, better educated, and more professional represen tatives. After all, we would not expect the demands and compensation of full-time legislative service to be particularly attractive to older, established businessmen, attorneys, and farmers. These individuals can afford to absorb the minor losses of income and time that part-time service exacts, but they would have to forego outside enterprises, and at tendant affluence, security, and independence, in order to serve as full time legislators. Hence, professional and quasi-professional legislatures should hold greater attraction for younger, non-established types. We would further speculate that as this new generation of quasi-professional legislators becomes entrenched within the leadership echelons of the Arkansas House, the path coefficient between age and success would become positive, i.e., older legislators more successful than younger legislators, yielding a substantial net effect for the variable age.
Attention should also be drawn to the absence of direct linkages between formal office and reputation for influence, on the one hand, and actual legislative success on the other. Undoubtedly any measure of perceived influence is going to include certain subtleties and biases that a straightforward measure of success should minimize or avoid. One could view influence, for example, as the ability to prevent someone else's success. Hence, one could be judged influential without being successful in bill passage. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that formal legislative leaders rule and exert power by controlling the flow of legislation as opposed to sponsoring it (Francis 1962). In any case, these findings underscore the importance of distinguishing be tween "reputation" and actual success, as noted by Dahl earlier.
Finally, environmental influences were not as powerful as pro jected. The distinction between urban and rural legislators did not materialize, as metropolitan representatives generally fared no worse (or better) than their rural colleagues. Representatives from the delta regions, however, were somewhat more likely to achieve seniority (and, indirectly, formal position, reputation, and legislative success) than legislators from the non-delta districts.
Conclusion
Clearly power is not distributed equally in any state legislature. Therefore, legislative output will reflect the policy proclivities and biases of an effective subgroup, such as that identified here. Identification of the determinants of success and their causal linkages is crucial if political scientists and others are to understand, and ultimately predict, legisla tive behavior and policy output. Unfortunately, there is no general model or theory that explains and accounts for legislative success at the state level.
Armed with insights and propositions based on previous studies of two-party/one-party dominant state legislatures, we attempted to construct a model of legislative success in the "one party-no party" legislature of Arkansas using path analytic techniques. Employing a relatively new measure of legislative success we ascertained four direct paths to legislative success in the Arkansas House: educational level, age, race, and seniority. That seniority exhibited the most powerful direct path (B = .40) to legislative influence was not surprising given the personalized style of Arkansas politics and its emphasis upon accommo dation. The impacts of occupational prestige, political ideology and gender on legislative success were negligible, as was that of urban-rural differences.
Contrary to expectations, neither formal office nor reputational influence were linked to a legislator's success in bill passage. This finding illuminated the danger of substituting indirect measures of legislative success for direct measures. It also signalled a possible shift in Arkansas' legislative environment. We noted that younger, better educated repre sentatives had acquired bases of power in the legislature independent of seniority and formal position. This is characteristic of legislatures in transition from closed, hierarchical systems rooted in social camaraderie to ones more competitive, fragmented, and independent in structure 
